cbdc:public:cbdc_omg:04_doc:20_comments:dsn:q18:start
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| | [[cbdc:public:cbdc_omg:04_doc:20_comments:dsn:start| Return to Design Considerations ]] | <WRAP> | | [[cbdc:public:cbdc_omg:04_doc:20_comments:dsn:start| Return to Design Considerations ]] | <WRAP> | ||
| <html><b> | <html><b> | ||
| - | <a href="mailto:[email protected]?Subject=OMG CBDC Response: | + | <a href="mailto:[email protected]?Subject=OMG's CBDC WG Response: |
| Question: 18. Should a CBDC have “offline” capabilities? If so, how might that be achieved? | Question: 18. Should a CBDC have “offline” capabilities? If so, how might that be achieved? | ||
| ">Provide Feedback</a></b> | ">Provide Feedback</a></b> | ||
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| : //Disconnected, Intermittent, and Limited (DIL) occur in wireless/mobile networking environments, e.g. rural area networks, vehicular networks, battlefield networks, and other resource-constrained or disadvantaged networks. Efficient and effective [[https://www.omgwiki.org/dido/doku.php?id=dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:i:interoperability|interoperability]] in these networks are highly demanded various [[https://www.omgwiki.org/dido/doku.php?id=dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:m:missioncritical | mission-critical]] systems and [[https://www.omgwiki.org/dido/doku.php?id=dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:a:application|application]] scenarios such as disaster relief in ravaged regions, search and rescue in remote areas and military/tactical operations in hostile environments. ([[https://www.omgwiki.org/dido/doku.php?id=dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:d:dil | DIDO-RA]] and [[https://icc2018.ieee-icc.org/workshop/3rd-international-workshop-service-oriented-computing-disconnected-intermittent-and-limited | IEEE ]])// | : //Disconnected, Intermittent, and Limited (DIL) occur in wireless/mobile networking environments, e.g. rural area networks, vehicular networks, battlefield networks, and other resource-constrained or disadvantaged networks. Efficient and effective [[https://www.omgwiki.org/dido/doku.php?id=dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:i:interoperability|interoperability]] in these networks are highly demanded various [[https://www.omgwiki.org/dido/doku.php?id=dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:m:missioncritical | mission-critical]] systems and [[https://www.omgwiki.org/dido/doku.php?id=dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:a:application|application]] scenarios such as disaster relief in ravaged regions, search and rescue in remote areas and military/tactical operations in hostile environments. ([[https://www.omgwiki.org/dido/doku.php?id=dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:d:dil | DIDO-RA]] and [[https://icc2018.ieee-icc.org/workshop/3rd-international-workshop-service-oriented-computing-disconnected-intermittent-and-limited | IEEE ]])// | ||
| - | A DIL can occur whenever a network becomes unavailable. The definition of a DIL, elaborates on three cases: disaster relief in ravaged regions, search and rescue in remote areas, and military/tactical operations in hostile environments. A fourth case, Network Outages is added to highlight just how fragile the reliance on networks can be. | + | A DIL can occur whenever a network becomes unavailable. The definition of a DIL elaborates on three cases: disaster relief in ravaged regions, search and rescue in remote areas, and military/tactical operations in hostile environments. A fourth case, Network Outages is added to highlight just how fragile the reliance on networks can be. |
| <table> | <table> | ||
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| <figure> | <figure> | ||
| - | {{cbdc:private:cbdc_omg:04_doc:20_comments:dsn:screen_shot_2022-02-15_at_7.31.56_pm.png?600|}} | + | {{cbdc:04_doc:20_comments:dsn:screen_shot_2022-02-15_at_7.31.56_pm.png?600|}} |
| - | {{cbdc:private:cbdc_omg:04_doc:20_comments:dsn:screen_shot_2022-02-15_at_7.35.34_pm.png?300|}} | + | {{cbdc:04_doc:20_comments:dsn:screen_shot_2022-02-15_at_7.35.34_pm.png?300|}} |
| <caption>Broadband coveragein the USA</caption> | <caption>Broadband coveragein the USA</caption> | ||
| </figure> | </figure> | ||
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| </WRAP>| | </WRAP>| | ||
| ^ Military/tactical operations in hostile environments |<WRAP> | ^ Military/tactical operations in hostile environments |<WRAP> | ||
| - | [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communication_with_submarines | Communication with submarines]] is a field within military communications that presents technical challenges and requires specialized technology. Because radio waves do not travel well through good electrical conductors like salt water, submerged submarines are cut off from radio communication with their command authorities at ordinary radio frequencies. Submarines can surface and raise an antenna above the sea level, then use ordinary radio transmissions, however this makes them vulnerable to detection by anti-submarine warfare forces. Early submarines during World War II mostly traveled on the surface because of their limited underwater speed and endurance; they dived mainly to evade immediate threats. During the Cold War, however, nuclear-powered submarines were developed that could stay submerged for months. In the event of a nuclear war, submerged ballistic missile submarines have to be ordered quickly to launch their missiles. Transmitting messages to these submarines is an active area of research. Very low frequency (VLF) radio waves can penetrate seawater a few hundred feet (10–40 meters), and many navies use powerful shore VLF transmitters for submarine communications. A few nations have built transmitters which use extremely low frequency (ELF) radio waves, which can penetrate seawater to reach submarines at operating depths, but these require huge antennas. Other techniques that have been used include sonar and blue lasers. | + | [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communication_with_submarines | Communication with submarines]] is a field within military communications that presents technical challenges and requires specialized technology. Because radio waves do not travel well through good electrical conductors like saltwater, submerged submarines are cut off from radio communication with their command authorities at ordinary radio frequencies. Submarines can surface and raise an antenna above the sea level, then use ordinary radio transmissions, however, this makes them vulnerable to detection by anti-submarine warfare forces. Early submarines during World War II mostly traveled on the surface because of their limited underwater speed and endurance; they dived mainly to evade immediate threats. During the Cold War, however, nuclear-powered submarines were developed that could stay submerged for months. In the event of a nuclear war, submerged ballistic missile submarines have to be ordered quickly to launch their missiles. Transmitting messages to these submarines is an active area of research. Very low frequency (VLF) radio waves can penetrate seawater a few hundred feet (10–40 meters), and many navies use powerful shore VLF transmitters for submarine communications. A few nations have built transmitters that use extremely low frequency (ELF) radio waves, which can penetrate seawater to reach submarines at operating depths, but these require huge antennas. Other techniques that have been used include sonar and blue lasers. |
| </WRAP>| | </WRAP>| | ||
| ^ Network Outages | <WRAP> | ^ Network Outages | <WRAP> | ||
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| </table> | </table> | ||
| - | Many of these problems creat a situation often referred to as the [[https://www.omgwiki.org/dido/doku.php?id=dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.k_consensus:01_definition:start#two_generals_problem | Two Generals Problem]] which for the most part is unsolvable. However, if each generals can work independently of each other (i.e., disconnected or offline), then the number of occurrences of the **Two Generals Problem** are reduced. | + | Many of these problems create a situation often referred to as the [[https://www.omgwiki.org/dido/doku.php?id=dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.k_consensus:01_definition:start#two_generals_problem | Two Generals Problem]] which for the most part is unsolvable. However, if each general can work independently of the other (i.e., disconnected or offline), then the number of occurrences of the **Two Generals Problem** is reduced. |
| - | : **Note:** The Two Generals is related to, but distinct from the [[https://www.omgwiki.org/dido/doku.php?id=dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.k_consensus:01_definition:start#byzantine_general_problem | Byzantine General Problem]]. The Two Generals problem is about the weakness in the connectivity between the Generals. The Byzantine General Problem is about the weakness of a General. | + | : **Note:** The Two Generals is related to, but distinct from [[https://www.omgwiki.org/dido/doku.php?id=dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.k_consensus:01_definition:start#byzantine_general_problem | Byzantine General Problem]]. The Two Generals problem is about the weakness in the connectivity between the Generals. The Byzantine General Problem is about the weakness of a General. |
| <table internetoutage> | <table internetoutage> | ||
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| ^ Year ^ Name ^ Country or region ^ Affected users ^ Number of affected users (rough) ^ Description ^ Duration (rough) ^ Internet component ^ Cause ^ Entity responsible ^ Type| | ^ Year ^ Name ^ Country or region ^ Affected users ^ Number of affected users (rough) ^ Description ^ Duration (rough) ^ Internet component ^ Cause ^ Entity responsible ^ Type| | ||
| ^ 16 Jul 1997 | DNS TLD Outage | Worldwide | | 50,000,000 | An Ingress database failure resulted in corrupt .com and .net zones, which were subsequently released to the DNS root servers. As the root servers were reloaded, they began to return failures for all domains in the .com and .net zones. | 4 hours | DNS | Automation and Human Failure | InterNIC / Network Solutions | All .com and .net domains| | ^ 16 Jul 1997 | DNS TLD Outage | Worldwide | | 50,000,000 | An Ingress database failure resulted in corrupt .com and .net zones, which were subsequently released to the DNS root servers. As the root servers were reloaded, they began to return failures for all domains in the .com and .net zones. | 4 hours | DNS | Automation and Human Failure | InterNIC / Network Solutions | All .com and .net domains| | ||
| - | ^ 2008 | 2008 submarine cable disruption | Middle East and the Mediterranean Sea | | | Three separate incidents of major damage to submarine optical communication cables around the world occurred in 2008. The first incident caused damage involving up to five high-speed Internet submarine communications cables in the Mediterranean Sea and Middle East from 23 January to 4 February 2008, causing internet disruptions and slowdowns for users in the Middle East and India. In late February there was another outage, this time affecting a fiber optic connection between Singapore and Jakarta. On 19 December, FLAG FEA, GO-1, SEA-ME-WE 3, and SEA-ME-WE 4 were all cut. | | submarine cables | Unknown | Unknown | | | + | ^ 2008 | 2008 submarine cable disruption | Middle East and the Mediterranean Sea | | | Three separate incidents of major damage to submarine optical communication cables around the world occurred in 2008. The first incident caused damage involving up to five high-speed Internet submarine communications cables in the Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East from 23 January to 4 February 2008, causing internet disruptions and slowdowns for users in the Middle East and India. In late February there was another outage, this time affecting a fiber optic connection between Singapore and Jakarta. On 19 December, FLAG FEA, GO-1, SEA-ME-WE 3, and SEA-ME-WE 4 were all cut. | | submarine cables | Unknown | Unknown | | |
| - | ^ 2011 | 2011 submarine cable disruption | South Asia and the Middle East | | | Two incidents of submarine communications cables cut off on 25 December 2011. The first cut off occurred to SEA-ME-WE 3 at Suez canal, Egypt and the second cut off occurred to i2i which took place between Chennai, India and Singapore line. Both the incidents had caused the Internet disruptions and slowdowns for users in the South Asia and Middle East in particular UAE. | submarine cables | Unknown | Unknown | | | + | ^ 2011 | 2011 submarine cable disruption | South Asia and the Middle East | | | Two incidents of submarine communications cables cut off on 25 December 2011. The first cut-off occurred to SEA-ME-WE 3 at Suez Canal, Egypt and the second cut-off occurred to i2i which took place between Chennai, India, and Singapore line. Both the incidents had caused Internet disruptions and slowdowns for users in South Asia and the Middle East in particular UAE. | submarine cables | Unknown | Unknown | | |
| ^ 2011 | | Armenia | | 3,000,000 | A woman digging for scrap metal damaged land cables and thereby severed most connectivity for the nation of Armenia. | 5 hours | land cables | digging | | Full| | ^ 2011 | | Armenia | | 3,000,000 | A woman digging for scrap metal damaged land cables and thereby severed most connectivity for the nation of Armenia. | 5 hours | land cables | digging | | Full| | ||
| ^ 2011 | | Egypt | | | The Internet in Egypt was shut down by the government, whereby approximately 93% of networks were without access in 2011 in an attempt to stop mobilization for anti-government protests. | | ISPs | government censorship | Egypt | Full| | ^ 2011 | | Egypt | | | The Internet in Egypt was shut down by the government, whereby approximately 93% of networks were without access in 2011 in an attempt to stop mobilization for anti-government protests. | | ISPs | government censorship | Egypt | Full| | ||
| ^ 2012 | | 2012 Syrian internet outage | Syria | | <WRAP> | ^ 2012 | | 2012 Syrian internet outage | Syria | | <WRAP> | ||
| - | On 29 November 2012 the Syrian Internet was cut off from the rest of the world. The autonomous system (AS29386) of Syrian Telecommunication Establishment (STE) was cut off completely at 10:26 UTC. Five prefixes were reported to have remained up, this is why Dyn reports an outage of 92% of the country. | + | On 29 November 2012, the Syrian Internet was cut off from the rest of the world. The autonomous system (AS29386) of the Syrian Telecommunication Establishment (STE) was cut off completely at 10:26 UTC. Five prefixes were reported to have remained up, this is why Dyn reports an outage in 92% of the country. |
| Responsibility for the outage has somewhat speculatively been blamed on various organizations. | Responsibility for the outage has somewhat speculatively been blamed on various organizations. | ||
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| ^ 2019 | Iranian internet shutdown | Iran | | | The Internet in Iran was shut down by the government, whereby approximately 96% of networks were without access in an attempt to stop mobilization for anti-government protests. | 7 days | ISPs | government censorship | Iran | Full| | ^ 2019 | Iranian internet shutdown | Iran | | | The Internet in Iran was shut down by the government, whereby approximately 96% of networks were without access in an attempt to stop mobilization for anti-government protests. | 7 days | ISPs | government censorship | Iran | Full| | ||
| ^ 2019 | Internet shutdown in India | India | | 50,000,000 | The Government of India passed the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 which caused huge controversy and mass protest in various parts of India. In order to prevent protests and outrage on social media, various state governments including those of Assam, Tripura, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, West Bengal, and Uttar Pradesh decided to shut down internet access. | Up to 9 days Over one year (Kashmir) | | government censorship | Various State governments of India | Full| | ^ 2019 | Internet shutdown in India | India | | 50,000,000 | The Government of India passed the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 which caused huge controversy and mass protest in various parts of India. In order to prevent protests and outrage on social media, various state governments including those of Assam, Tripura, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, West Bengal, and Uttar Pradesh decided to shut down internet access. | Up to 9 days Over one year (Kashmir) | | government censorship | Various State governments of India | Full| | ||
| - | ^ 2019 | 2019 Burmese internet shutdown | Myanmar | | | On June 21, the Internet in Burma was shut down by the government. The Burmese government shut down the internet connection in nine townships of the northern Arakan State and one single township in the Southern Chin State, which was proposed by Burmese Military officers. The shutdown is ongoing, and has become the world's longest internet shutdown. | | | Government censorship | Burma | Full| | + | ^ 2019 | 2019 Burmese internet shutdown | Myanmar | | | On June 21, the Internet in Burma was shut down by the government. The Burmese government shut down the internet connection in nine townships of the northern Arakan State and one single township in the Southern Chin State, which was proposed by Burmese Military officers. The shutdown is ongoing and has become the world's longest internet shutdown. | | | Government censorship | Burma | Full| |
| - | ^ 2019 | 2019 Papua protests | Indonesia | | | To curb the escalating protests that occurred in the Indonesian provinces of Papua and West Papua, the Indonesian authority imposed an internet blackout on both provinces on 21 August 2019. The blackout continues until the authority partially lift the blackout in 4 September on several regions, with complete lifting of the restriction only occurred in 9 September. | 19 days | | Government censorship | Indonesia | Full| | + | ^ 2019 | 2019 Papua protests | Indonesia | | | To curb the escalating protests that occurred in the Indonesian provinces of Papua and West Papua, the Indonesian authority imposed an internet blackout on both provinces on 21 August 2019. The blackout continues until the authority partially lift the blackout on 4 September in several regions, with the complete lifting of the restriction only occurring on 9 September. | 19 days | | Government censorship | Indonesia | Full| |
| ^ 2021 | | North Korea | | | On October 21st, North Korean internet infrastructure dropped off the internet, including public-facing websites and email servers. All servers which were subject to monitoring were found to be offline. | At least 14 minutes | | Unknown | Unknown | | | ^ 2021 | | North Korea | | | On October 21st, North Korean internet infrastructure dropped off the internet, including public-facing websites and email servers. All servers which were subject to monitoring were found to be offline. | At least 14 minutes | | Unknown | Unknown | | | ||
| ^ 2021 | Facebook Outage | Worldwide | LAN Internet Connection | 2,850,000,000 | <WRAP> | ^ 2021 | Facebook Outage | Worldwide | LAN Internet Connection | 2,850,000,000 | <WRAP> | ||
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| [[cbdc:public:cbdc_omg:04_doc:20_comments:dsn:q18:start| Return to Top]] | [[cbdc:public:cbdc_omg:04_doc:20_comments:dsn:q18:start| Return to Top]] | ||
| - | Some of these [[https://www.omgwiki.org/dido/doku.php?id=dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:d:dil | Disconnected, Intermittent and Limited (DIL)]] requirements were alluded to in the White Paper, but not directly specified or defined. The Table {{ref>dilReqiurements}} provides an example of cross-referencing the DIL Requirements to the Benefits, Policy Considerations, Risks and Design requirements identified in the [[cbdc:public:cbdc_omg:04_doc:12_summary:start| White Paper Analysis]] done by the [[https://www.omg.org/ | Object Management Group ]]. | + | Some of these [[https://www.omgwiki.org/dido/doku.php?id=dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:d:dil | Disconnected, Intermittent and Limited (DIL)]] requirements were alluded to in the White Paper, but not directly specified or defined. The Table {{ref>dilReqiurements}} provides an example of cross-referencing the DIL Requirements to the Benefits, Policy Considerations, Risks and Design requirements identified in the [[cbdc:public:cbdc_omg:04_doc:12_summary:start| White Paper Analysis]] done by the [[https://www.omg.org/ | Object Management Group's ]] CBDC WG. |
| <table dilReqiurements> | <table dilReqiurements> | ||
| - | <caption>Example of mapping a subset of requirements identified during the White Paper Analysis conducted by the OMG</caption> | + | <caption>Example of mapping a subset of requirements identified during the White Paper Analysis conducted by the OMG's CBDC WG.</caption> |
| ^ Topic ^ Requirements ^ | ^ Topic ^ Requirements ^ | ||
| ^ Disaster relief in ravaged regions | <WRAP> | ^ Disaster relief in ravaged regions | <WRAP> | ||
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| * [[https://www.omgwiki.org/dido/doku.php?id=dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:b:bluetooth | Bluetoth]] | * [[https://www.omgwiki.org/dido/doku.php?id=dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:b:bluetooth | Bluetoth]] | ||
| - | * [[https://www.omgwiki.org/dido/doku.php?id=dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:z:zigbee | zigbee]] | + | * [[https://www.omgwiki.org/dido/doku.php?id=dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:z:zigbee | Zigbee]] |
| * [[https://www.omgwiki.org/dido/doku.php?id=dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:n:nfc | Near-Field-Communication (NFC) ]] | * [[https://www.omgwiki.org/dido/doku.php?id=dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:n:nfc | Near-Field-Communication (NFC) ]] | ||
cbdc/public/cbdc_omg/04_doc/20_comments/dsn/q18/start.1652827092.txt.gz · Last modified: 2022/05/17 18:38 by nick
