dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.k_consensus:05_algorithm:start
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dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.k_consensus:05_algorithm:start [2021/08/11 10:43] murphy |
dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.k_consensus:05_algorithm:start [2022/01/15 18:16] (current) nick |
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| - | ====== 4.0 Consensus Platforms ====== | + | ====== K.4 Consensus Platforms ====== |
| - | [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.k_consensus | Return to DIDO Consensus ]] | + | [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.k_consensus:start| Return to DIDO Consensus ]] |
| <table ConsensusAlorithym> | <table ConsensusAlorithym> | ||
| <caption>Crossreference os [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:d:dido_platform|DIDO Platforms]] with Alogrithms.</caption> | <caption>Crossreference os [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:d:dido_platform|DIDO Platforms]] with Alogrithms.</caption> | ||
| - | ^ Consensus Alorithym ^ Platform Examples ^ Pros ^ Cons ^ Type ^ | + | ^ Consensus Algorithm ^ Platform Examples ^ Pros ^ Cons ^ Type ^ |
| ^ [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.k_consensus:02_mechanism:cellular ]] | <WRAP> | ^ [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.k_consensus:02_mechanism:cellular ]] | <WRAP> | ||
| //Theoretical//</WRAP> |<WRAP> | //Theoretical//</WRAP> |<WRAP> | ||
| Line 14: | Line 14: | ||
| NEO</WRAP> |<WRAP> | NEO</WRAP> |<WRAP> | ||
| * Generating a new block on the chain takes between 15 and 20 seconds. | * Generating a new block on the chain takes between 15 and 20 seconds. | ||
| - | * The transaction throughput is close to 1,000 TPS. NEO hopes to reach 100,000 TPS, which would allow the network to support large-scale commercial applications. | + | * The transaction [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:t:thruput|throughput]] is close to 1,000 TPS. NEO hopes to reach 100,000 TPS, which would allow the network to support large-scale commercial applications.\\ |
| * No expenditure of energy needed (unlike the Proof-of-Work [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:c:consensus_algorithm|consensus algorithm]]). | * No expenditure of energy needed (unlike the Proof-of-Work [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:c:consensus_algorithm|consensus algorithm]]). | ||
| * Total finality for transactions after their [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:c:confirmation|confirmation]]. | * Total finality for transactions after their [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:c:confirmation|confirmation]]. | ||
| * There are no forks on the NEO [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:b:blockchain|blockchain]]. | * There are no forks on the NEO [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:b:blockchain|blockchain]]. | ||
| + | |||
| [[https://coinrivet.com/delegated-byzantine-fault-tolerance-dbft-explained/]] | [[https://coinrivet.com/delegated-byzantine-fault-tolerance-dbft-explained/]] | ||
| </WRAP> |<WRAP> | </WRAP> |<WRAP> | ||
| Line 27: | Line 28: | ||
| Steem, EOS, BitShares, Steemit, Lisk, Ark | Steem, EOS, BitShares, Steemit, Lisk, Ark | ||
| </WRAP> |<WRAP> | </WRAP> |<WRAP> | ||
| - | * Scalability and speed: It provides faster processing of transactions than PoW and PoS. This is probably the most meaningful advantage: DPoS makes sense for many applications that require a high level of scalability. | + | * [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:s:scalable|Scalability]] and speed: It provides faster processing of transactions than PoW and PoS. This is probably the most meaningful advantage: DPoS makes sense for many applications that require a high level of scalability. |
| * Better distribution of rewards: Theoretically, people will elect only those delegates who give them the most rewards, so everyone, including a casual user, benefits. (This democratization is another aspect supporters cite when noting that DPoS is more decentralized than either PoS or PoW.) | * Better distribution of rewards: Theoretically, people will elect only those delegates who give them the most rewards, so everyone, including a casual user, benefits. (This democratization is another aspect supporters cite when noting that DPoS is more decentralized than either PoS or PoW.) | ||
| * Real-time voting security: Voters can immediately detect malicious actions, and the malicious delegate can be voted out of the system. | * Real-time voting security: Voters can immediately detect malicious actions, and the malicious delegate can be voted out of the system. | ||
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| * Less hardware: Participants don’t need costly, specialized equipment. A regular computer is powerful enough. | * Less hardware: Participants don’t need costly, specialized equipment. A regular computer is powerful enough. | ||
| * An incentive to “behave”: [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:b:block_producers|Block producers]] — delegates — can be voted out at any time, so the potential for loss of income and reputation provides a hedge against bad behavior. | * An incentive to “behave”: [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:b:block_producers|Block producers]] — delegates — can be voted out at any time, so the potential for loss of income and reputation provides a hedge against bad behavior. | ||
| - | * Flexibility: Because DPoS unlinks the election of block producers from the block production itself, it allows for a more creative and flexible approach to solving problems with either, in isolation, a recent Coinmonks piece explains. It provides a foundation for implementing “interesting governance models in blockchain applications.” | + | * Flexibility: Because DPoS unlinks the election of block producers from the block production itself, it allows for a more creative and flexible approach to solving problems with either, in isolation, a recent Coinmonks piece explains. It provides a foundation for implementing “interesting [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:g:governance]] models in blockchain applications.” |
| [[https://www.verypossible.com/insights/pros-and-cons-of-the-delegated-proof-of-stake-consensus-model]] | [[https://www.verypossible.com/insights/pros-and-cons-of-the-delegated-proof-of-stake-consensus-model]] | ||
| </WRAP> |<WRAP> | </WRAP> |<WRAP> | ||
| * It's easier to organize an attack: Because fewer people are in charge of keeping the network alive, it’s easier to organize a “51 percent” attack. | * It's easier to organize an attack: Because fewer people are in charge of keeping the network alive, it’s easier to organize a “51 percent” attack. | ||
| - | * The rich may get richer: People’s vote strength is determined by how many tokens they have, which means that people who own more tokens will influence the network more than people who own very few. | + | * The rich may get richer: People’s vote strength is determined by how many [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:t:tokens|tokens]] they have, which means that people who own more tokens will influence the network more than people who own very few. |
| * Apathy can kill: Without a large number of engaged users, the system will not function as intended. (That’s a bit like any democracy or democratic republic.) | * Apathy can kill: Without a large number of engaged users, the system will not function as intended. (That’s a bit like any democracy or democratic republic.) | ||
| - | * Delegates could form cartels: Delegates can organize into cartels by concentrating the role of validation in a smaller number of hands. This not only makes it less decentralized, but it also makes it less resilient. | + | * Delegates could form cartels: Delegates can organize into cartels by concentrating the role of [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:v:validation|validation]] in a smaller number of hands. This not only makes it less decentralized, but it also makes it less resilient. |
| * This notion that DPoS is not truly decentralized may be the most notable criticism of all. Yes, DPoS is less centralized than some other consensus protocols; nevertheless, power is still concentrated in the hands of a handful of users. DPoS sacrifices decentralization for scalability, critics say. | * This notion that DPoS is not truly decentralized may be the most notable criticism of all. Yes, DPoS is less centralized than some other consensus protocols; nevertheless, power is still concentrated in the hands of a handful of users. DPoS sacrifices decentralization for scalability, critics say. | ||
| [[https://www.verypossible.com/insights/pros-and-cons-of-the-delegated-proof-of-stake-consensus-model]] | [[https://www.verypossible.com/insights/pros-and-cons-of-the-delegated-proof-of-stake-consensus-model]] | ||
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| * High throughput; scalable | * High throughput; scalable | ||
| * No [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:m:mining|mining]] mechanism like in PoW, PoA uses identity as the sole verification of the authority to validate, | * No [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:m:mining|mining]] mechanism like in PoW, PoA uses identity as the sole verification of the authority to validate, | ||
| - | * PoA is suited for both private networks and public networks | + | * PoA is suited for both [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:p:private_network|private networks]] and [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:p:public_network|public networks]] |
| * PoA only allows non-consecutive block approval from any one validator, meaning that the risk of serious damage is minimized. | * PoA only allows non-consecutive block approval from any one validator, meaning that the risk of serious damage is minimized. | ||
| [[https://tokens-economy.gitbook.io/consensus/chain-based-hybrid-models/proof-of-authority-poa]] | [[https://tokens-economy.gitbook.io/consensus/chain-based-hybrid-models/proof-of-authority-poa]] | ||
| Line 123: | Line 124: | ||
| * Some say that PoB is not really eco-friendly because the Bitcoins being burned are generated through PoW mining, which requires lots of resources. | * Some say that PoB is not really eco-friendly because the Bitcoins being burned are generated through PoW mining, which requires lots of resources. | ||
| * Not proven to work on larger scales. More testing is needed to confirm its efficiency and security. | * Not proven to work on larger scales. More testing is needed to confirm its efficiency and security. | ||
| - | * The verification of the work done by miners tends to be delayed. It is not as fast as in Proof of Work blockchains. | + | * The verification of the work done by miners tends to be delayed. It is not as fast as in [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:p:proof_of_work|Proof of Work]] blockchains. |
| * The process of burning a coin is not always transparent or easily verifiable by the average user. | * The process of burning a coin is not always transparent or easily verifiable by the average user. | ||
| [[https://academy.binance.com/en/articles/proof-of-burn-explained]] | [[https://academy.binance.com/en/articles/proof-of-burn-explained]] | ||
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| Burstcoin and SpaceMint, IPFS</WRAP> |<WRAP> | Burstcoin and SpaceMint, IPFS</WRAP> |<WRAP> | ||
| * Similar to PoW but uses space instead of computation. Thus much environmental friendly. | * Similar to PoW but uses space instead of computation. Thus much environmental friendly. | ||
| - | * Can be used for malware detection, by determining whether the L1 cache of a processor is empty (e.g., has enough space to evaluate the PoSpace routine without cache misses) or contains a routine that resisted being evicted. | + | * Can be used for malware detection, by determining whether the L1 cache of a [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:p:start|processor]] is empty (e.g., has enough space to evaluate the PoSpace routine without cache misses) or contains a routine that resisted being evicted. |
| * Can be used for anti-spam measures and denial of service attack prevention. | * Can be used for anti-spam measures and denial of service attack prevention. | ||
| * PoC can use any regular hard drives including those with Android-based systems. | * PoC can use any regular hard drives including those with Android-based systems. | ||
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| Hyperledger Sawtooth, Resource-Efficient Mining (REM)</WRAP> |<WRAP> | Hyperledger Sawtooth, Resource-Efficient Mining (REM)</WRAP> |<WRAP> | ||
| * PoET is a substantial improvement in the efficiency of proof of work systems. Simultaneously, it also provides a great solution to the “Random Leader Selection Problem” without being resource-intensive or requiring complex staking mechanics and incentive structures necessary with proof of stake consensus. | * PoET is a substantial improvement in the efficiency of proof of work systems. Simultaneously, it also provides a great solution to the “Random Leader Selection Problem” without being resource-intensive or requiring complex staking mechanics and incentive structures necessary with proof of stake consensus. | ||
| - | * PoET is also an excellent consensus mechanism for permissioned networks, which is why it is the go-to consensus mechanism for Hyperledger Sawtooth. On top of that, it scales efficiently and can be used as a “plug and play” model for testing environments with Hyperledger Sawtooth. | + | * PoET is also an excellent consensus mechanism for [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:p:permissioned|permissioned networks]], which is why it is the go-to consensus mechanism for Hyperledger Sawtooth. On top of that, it scales efficiently and can be used as a “plug and play” model for testing environments with Hyperledger Sawtooth. |
| [[https://blockonomi.com/proof-of-elapsed-time-consensus/]] | [[https://blockonomi.com/proof-of-elapsed-time-consensus/]] | ||
| </WRAP> |<WRAP> | </WRAP> |<WRAP> | ||
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| Bitcoin, [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:l:litecoin|Litecoin]], ZCash, Primecoin, Monero, Vertcoin</WRAP> |<WRAP> | Bitcoin, [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:l:litecoin|Litecoin]], ZCash, Primecoin, Monero, Vertcoin</WRAP> |<WRAP> | ||
| * Proof of work models make blockchain networks more difficult and costly to attack. | * Proof of work models make blockchain networks more difficult and costly to attack. | ||
| - | * Proof of work models reward miners with both a block reward and a share of transaction fees. | + | * Proof of work models reward miners with both a block reward and a share of [[dido:public:ra:xapend:xapend.a_glossary:t:transaction_fees|transaction fees]]. |
| * Proof of work models often results in more decentralized networks. | * Proof of work models often results in more decentralized networks. | ||
| * Less opportunity for 51% attack | * Less opportunity for 51% attack | ||
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| </table> | </table> | ||
| + | |||
| + | <color blue><todo @char> Do general review of this page </todo></color> \\ | ||
| + | <color blue><todo @char> Decide if it's worthwhile to fix the unordered lists so they look better in pdfexport </todo></color> | ||
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dido/public/ra/xapend/xapend.k_consensus/05_algorithm/start.1628692983.txt.gz · Last modified: 2021/08/11 10:43 by murphy
