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In order to answer this compound question, each part of the question is answered separately:
Although Cyber Resiliency is affected by the Operational Resiliency of the system as a whole, the two topics need to be treated separately. Therefore, the question has been subdivided into two questions:
Within the context of CBDC, Operational Resilience neds to address a few things and is not something that can be added on or bolted onto an existing systems, it must be baked in so to speak. This means that for something that is new, like the CBDC, it starts with spcifying the requirements, both non-Functional and Functional Rerquirements.
Operational Resiliency also means that once the CBDC is up and opertional, it needs to respond to internal issues requiring continuous monitoring and adaptation of the CBDC to ensure it continues to has Operational Resiliency and also that it able to evolve to live way beyond any existing software or harward component that comprises the CBDC.
Operational Resiliency also means that it must continue to adapt to the surround situations (i.e., hostile cyber threats, physical threats like hurricanes, earthquakes, and fire) and evolving national and geopollitical situations. The current Ukraine-Russian conflict is an example.
In other words, Operational Resiliency for the CBDC is not a done and dusted sort of problem. It is a continuous process that covers the entire lifecyle of the CBDC or followon efforts.
A key aspect of Operational Resiliency is to develop “what-if” scenarios to validate the resilence of the system against the functiional and non-Functional requirements. Some possible scenarios might be:
A well-defined Resilience Plan that address the specific Functional and non-Functional requirements is essential. non-Functional Requirements for the CBDC.
In many ways, Operational Resiliency is a high level view of the Functional Requirements for the CBDC.
What is Operational Resilience?
Take These 3 Steps to Build Operational Resilience
Take a holistic view of organizational risk. Consider internal and external factors that impact your organization including business lines, assets, systems, processes, third parties, and people. Building a resilient operation means seeing the interconnection and interdependence of risk throughout the organization. Effective enterprise risk management systems must look across divisions and operations to holistically assess and account for potential threats.
Design systems that take a comprehensive approach to risk assessment. This starts with translating risk into a language that everyone at the firm understands. Having a common vernacular permits a more comprehensive analysis and documentation of potential risks throughout the organization. It also allows for a more robust discussion around risk and return as organizations consider how to adapt to changing conditions. Moreover, a shared language permits greater collaboration and cooperation, both critical to building a deeper understanding of the interdependence of risk in the organization and building operational resilience.
Assess for critical points of failure to inform robust processes, ensure systems capabilities, and cultivate adaptable practices. Although no market disruption or business interruption is the same, much can be learned from each. Knowing where the key risks lie across the organization and proactively implementing potential workarounds can help organizations better adapt to evolving conditions. The key is having robust systems and flexible processes, as well as cultivating a collaborative and resilient culture.
5 Ways to Strengthen Operational Resilience in the Financial Services Sector
For any financial services company, big or small, failure is not an option. Financial services play a critical, foundational role in almost every sector of the economy, and robust customer service is expected through technology failures, market disruption, systemic risk events, natural disasters, and even pandemics.
Companies that can deliver robust services through unexpected disruptions are considered operationally resilient. The critical importance of operational resilience in financial services is evidenced by the flurry of guidance from global financial regulators detailing expectations and mandating best practices on how providers and supporting infrastructure can improve their operational resilience.
Operational resilience, as defined by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), is the ability to deliver operations, including critical operations and core business lines, through disruption from any hazard. Last October, the FRB, in partnership with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, issued an interagency paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen Operational Resilience. This guidance, specifically written for banks and savings and loan companies with at least $100 billion in assets, can be adapted and applied to financial services companies of any size.
In short, operational resilience is built through “effective operational risk management combined with sufficient financial and operational resources to prepare, adapt, withstand, and recover from disruptions.” More than business continuity, which is focused on uninterrupted operations, operational resilience considers how to best adapt a firm’s operations to deliver services through any disruption.
1. Establish Effective Governance
Effective governance at the board and senior management level is critical to strengthening operational resilience. A strong risk management culture—the foundation of operational resilience—can only happen when there is top-down, organizational commitment. Board and executive responsibilities lay the groundwork and accountability for an operationally resilient mindset and commitment to supporting practices throughout the organization. 2. Identify Critical Assets
Disruption, by its nature, is unpredictable. Operational resilience is not about identifying and measuring risks and uncertainty, as the impact of evolving technology and market changes can rarely be predicted. It is instead a framework for protecting the core business.
The identification of critical assets and functions and core business lines should be done with the intention of protecting those assets and operations regardless of the source of disruption. Whether impacted by an unexpected technology failure, pandemic, cybersecurity incident, or any other cause, an operationally resilient firm will have the policies, procedures, and practices in place to guide them through any disruption.
To do this in a systematic way, the board must determine and approve the risk appetite and risk tolerance for operational disruption, both at the enterprise level and for critical operations and core business lines. These explicit board parameters for the firm’s acceptable level of risk from operational disruption can guide effective decision-making, appropriate investment in resilient systems and controls, and a consistent firm-wide approach to operational risk management. 3. Consider Key Dependencies and Interconnections
After identifying the core business lines and critical assets and functions, consider the key personnel, technology, processes, data, and physical infrastructure facilities required to protect them. Understanding those inputs and mapping out the dependency and interconnection of those assets on other internal functions, external parameters, or third parties will support a robust plan for business continuity and operational resilience.
Managing third-party risk is critical for operational resilience given the growing dependence on third parties to maintain specific functions and services of core business lines. This risk must also be accounted for within the approved risk tolerance.
An understanding of the entire picture is necessary for recovery planning and the buildout of appropriate redundancies and alternate availability of essential resources, personnel, technology capability, and, if necessary, physical infrastructure. Recovery planning should also be consistent with existing risk management practices to ensure that there are no gaps in providing service or meeting regulatory requirements. 4. Proactively Review and Audit Plans
Operational resilience is a dynamic process requiring periodic review, testing, and auditing. As systems and processes evolve, so should your plans. Regularly employing an internal or external audit function to assess the design and effectiveness of operational resilience efforts will help to keep your plans relevant, identify shortcomings due to process or policy changes, and support a firm-wide culture of risk management and operational resilience.
As new infrastructure and technology is adopted, your plans should be revisited and tested. Any digital transformation efforts should include planning for and adoption of policies to address digital risk, such as disruption due to an internal failure, cybersecurity incident, or processing error.
Consistent testing of your operational resilience plans, including dependencies and interconnections, will prepare your firm to pivot and adapt quickly through a disruption. 5. Form a Collaborative Approach to Operational Risk Management
An operational risk management function is responsible for determining and managing exposure related to internal processes, people, and systems as well as external threats and third parties. However, they cannot do this in a silo. Effective operational risk management requires a collaborative approach between senior management, business units, the operational risk management function or designees, and the internal or external audit function.
A cross-functional approach supports effective identification, mitigation, and resolution of operational risk, including technology and third-party risk, within the risk appetite and risk tolerance defined by the board while collaboration ensures a consistent, firm-wide approach and commitment to operational resilience.
The first step in designing for Cyber Resiliency is to begin with a Systems Engineering approach and to survey CBDC Stakeholders to refine the definitions and expectations of Cyber Resiliency. See CBDC Stakeholders for a more detailed discussion.
An important first step needs to be to follow the NIST Special Publication SP 800-16 volume 2 guidelines for developing cyber-resilient systems.1). Skipping this step and going right to design and implementation often ends with the problem space (i.e., CBDC) being defined by the product(s) it chooses to use rather than by the stakeholders requirements. A product based solution can work, but it often misses many key requirements important to the stakeholders. For example, the design must be Quantum Computing “safe” or resistent.
SP 800-16 provides a framework for conducting cyber resiliency engineering. It starts with defining and setting the goals, objectives, techniques, implementation approaches, design principles. Table 1 summarizes the definition and purpose of each construct, and how each construct is applied at the system level. Note: The framework is applicable to levels beyond the system level (e.g., mission or business function level, organizational level, or sector level).
| Construct | Definition, Purpose, and Application at the System Level |
|---|---|
| Goal | A high-level statement supporting (or focusing on) one aspect (i.e., anticipate, withstand, recover, adapt) in the definition of cyber resiliency.
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| Objective | A high-level statement (designed to be restated in system-specific and stakeholder-specific terms) of what a system must achieve in its operational environment and throughout its life cycle to meet stakeholder needs for mission assurance and resilient security. The objectives are more specific than goals and more relatable to threats.
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| Sub-Objective | A statement, subsidiary to a cyber resiliency objective, that emphasizes different aspects of that objective or identifies methods to achieve that objective.
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Activity | A statement of a capability or action that supports the achievement of a sub-objective and, hence, an objective.
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| Strategic Design Principle | A high-level statement that reflects an aspect of the risk management strategy that informs systems security engineering practices for an organization, mission, or system.
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Once the Systems Engineering is completed, a design can be made to foster cyber resiliency.
| Source | Money and Payments: The U.S. Dollar in the Age of Digital Transformation |
|---|---|
| Published Date: | January 2022 |
| Requestor | Board of Governors, The Federal Reserve System |
| Area | Research and Analysis |